

CS551 Project Presentation

iyibiAgent

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


Outline

1. **Problem Statement and Introduction**
2. Agent Design and Negotiation Strategy
 - 2.1. Bidding Strategy
 - 2.1.1. Production Strategy
 - 2.1.2. Trading Strategy
 - 2.2. Negotiation & Negotiator
 - 2.3. Acceptance Strategy
 - 2.4. Opponent Modelling & Learning Model
3. Evaluation
4. Conclusion & Future Work
5. References

Problem Statement

- A novel agent, "iyibiAgent", for 2021 Supply Chain Management League (SCML-Standard)
- Factory manager
- Risk-averse agent, minimize its cost of production, keeps its negotiations at the minimum, JIT manufacturing.
- Use of economic surplus model in each transaction [1].
- Adjusts its price factor according to this adapted economic surplus model.



The Graph of Economic Surplus



Outline


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Production Strategy

- Inspired by the Just in Time manufacturing philosophy [2]
- Decision is made by finding whether the production of item is feasible until the given deadline. No excess production.
- Only demand is considered while producing an item.
 - DemandDrivenProductionStrategy
 - takes into account the demands during production.
- Production schedule using a prediction module.
- Looking demands for the next day, keeps the volume low.

Trading Strategy

- Divides negotiation into 3 time-frames:
- Elicitation phase
 - first 20% of total steps / time
- Trading phase
 - between 20% to 80% of total steps / time
- Post-trading
 - last 20% of the total steps / time



Trading Strategy


Elicitation Phase

- Tries to increase the market price of the items by accepting bids with high prices



Trading Phase

- Behaves market neutral
- Healthy price dynamics for its input and output
- Acts according to economic surplus mechanism



Post Trading Phase

- Aims to produce with a certain loss
- A loss aversion technique is implemented

Market Analysis




Figure 2: Number of negotiations at each step




Figure 3: Market volume at each step

Trading Strategy

- Trading Pricing
 - Evolves around catalog price, determined by the progress of the negotiation and the trade prediction
- Economic Surplus
 - Increase/decrease the price with a dynamic ratio determined with ratio of bought/sold count if successful
 - Decrease/increase the price by 5% if the transaction is successful

Algorithm 1: Trading pricing mechanism

```
Data: contracts array
Result: buy/sell action
for contract in contracts do
    progress = current step / total steps;
    if sell contract then
        if unit price is less than  $\max(\text{progress}, 0.8) * \text{catalog price}$  then
            | cancel transaction;
    else if buy contract then
        if unit price is less than  $\min(\text{progress} * 2, 1.2) * \text{catalog price}$ 
            then
                | cancel transaction;
    else
        | continue with the transaction (truncated for brevity)
```

Algorithm 2: Economic Surplus mechanism

```
Data: contracts array
... output and input calculations omitted;
for contract in contracts do
    if seller surplus and sold count then
        | increase acceptable output price in ratio with surplus amount;
    else
        | decrease acceptable output price by 5%;
    if buyer surplus and bought count then
        | decrease acceptable input cost in ratio with surplus amount;
    else
        | increase acceptable input price by 5%;
```




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Negotiation & Negotiator

- A modified version of StepNegotiationController module from NEGMas
- Opponent Model applied version of the NEGMas's AspirationNegotiator is used
- It takes a defined “aspiration” from bidding strategy and can be a simple time based conceder, boulware or simply linear.



Taken from <http://www.yasserm.com/scml/scml2020docs/>



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Acceptance Strategy

- A modified version of ACnext [3]
 - The condition of accepting when the opponent's last offer is better than the predicted offer of the agent.
- Finds the acceptable price by using economic surplus [1]
 - Linear Utility function takes from economic surplus.
 - Buyers utility function is designed to be >0
 - Sellers utility function is designed to be <0
- Target Quantity and Target Price are altered according to the current negotiation step due to the market analysis



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Opponent Modelling

- Keeps track of the past negotiations and analyzes them to label the opponent.
- A simple heuristic is used for prediction.
- All of their bids are taken and then combined to fit a linear curve according to the utilities of our agent's bids.
- The slope of this curve is used in determining the type of the opponent.



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Evaluation of our agent

Table 1: Statistics for the first 100 tournaments

| | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | 1st Q. | Median | 3rd Q. | Max |
|-------------|-----|---------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| iyibiAgent | 100 | -0.0273 | 0.0168 | -0.0757 | -0.0381 | -0.0257 | -0.0757 | 0.0000 |
| SavingAgent | 100 | -0.101 | 0.0515 | -0.357 | -0.132 | -0.097 | -0.357 | -0.015 |
| SteadyMgr | 100 | -0.0829 | 0.0568 | -0.239 | -0.1194 | -0.0735 | -0.2391 | 0.0000 |
| MMM | 100 | -0.1107 | 0.0481 | -0.2290 | -0.1445 | -0.1071 | -0.2290 | -0.0055 |

Table 2: Statistics for the second 100 tournaments

| | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | 1st Q. | Median | 3rd Q. | Max |
|----------------|-----|---------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| iyibiAgent | 100 | -0.0263 | 0.0165 | -0.0725 | -0.0371 | -0.0259 | -0.0725 | 0.0000 |
| ASMASH | 100 | -0.1150 | 0.0473 | -0.2617 | -0.141 | -0.1076 | -0.2617 | -0.0074 |
| BARGentCovid19 | 100 | -0.0968 | 0.0462 | -0.2180 | -0.1207 | -0.0927 | -0.2180 | -0.0034 |
| Merchant | 100 | 0.4797 | 0.6480 | -0.3035 | -0.0825 | 0.3349 | -0.3035 | 3.4132 |



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Conclusion

- Our experiments show that iyibiAgent is able to outperform greedy competitors by adopting a more robust model which yields reasonable profits for any negotiation setup.

Future Work

- Build a better market awareness in our agent.
- Estimate the market phase using a time series model.
- An improvement in opponent modelling is needed.

References

- [1] R. Staneld, "A Revision of the Economic Surplus Concept," Review of Radical Political Economics 6, 69, pp. 69-74, 1974.
- [2] JIT retrieved from <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/jit.asp>
- [3] T. Baarslag, K. V. Hindriks, C. M. Jonker, Acceptance Conditions in Automated Negotiation, 2011.

Thank you for listening!